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Torts
By GERALD G. AsHDowN* AND PAULA S. HOSKINS**
I. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
The area of products liability has always been a fruitful
source of material for survey articles, and the past year in
Kentucky has been no exception. Kentucky's appellate courts
decided two major cases and the state legislature adopted new
guidelines for product liability actions. The Kentucky Su-
preme Court held that a design defect creating an unreasonable
danger may be obviated by an adequate warning. In another
case, the Court of Appeals reversed a jury verdict for the plain-
tiff and dismissed a suit against an automobile manufacturer
where the car in question was five years old and had undergone
substantial servicing and modification by the dealer.
A. Defective Design and the Effect of a Warning
The Supreme Court faced the troublesome area of design
defects in Bohnert Equipment Co. v. Kendall.' Kendall, a
crane operator, was injured when his employer's crane fell on
him, and he sought recovery against the crane's designers on a
strict liability theory. The evidence showed that Kendall's
employer, the Reynolds Metal Company, purchased the crane
from the designers, Cleveland Crane & Engineering Co. and
Bohnert Equipment Co., who arranged for its installation. The
crane was suspended from the ceiling by hanger rods, several
of which broke about one year later. When replacement rods
were ordered, Bohnert contacted Reynolds, and subsequently
representatives of Bohnert and Cleveland Crane visited the
Reynolds plant to determine the cause of the breakage. The
designers' representatives inspected the crane and informed
Reynolds' plant engineer that the runways on which the crane
travelled were moving in excess of recommended limits, caus-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.B.A. University of Iowa,
1969; J.D. University of Iowa, 1972.
** J.D. University of Kentucky, 1979.
569 S.W.2d 161 (Ky. 1978).
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ing the hanger rods to break. According to the defendants, the
plant engineer indicated he would correct the problem of exces-
sive sway by bracing, and Cleveland's representative in-
structed him on the appropriate manner of bracing. The de-
signers made a second trip to the plant, found no bracing, and
were again assured by the engineer that bracing would be in-
stalled. On a third visit a similar warning as to the necessity
for sway bracing was given.2
After a jury verdict for the defendants and reversal by the
Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court granted discretionary
review to consider whether the warnings given to Reynolds'
engineer exonerated the defendants from liability. Initially the
Court noted the uncontradicted expert testimony that the
crane when delivered without lateral sway bracing was defec-
tive.3 It then recognized the case as "another illustration of the
overlap between negligence principles and so-called strict lia-
bility theory where defective design . . . and warnings of the
dangers attending the use of the product are present."4 This
overlap results from the necessity of proving that a product is
defective in order for strict liability to be imposed under section
402A of the Second Restatement of the Law of Torts.5 However,
in the case of an alleged design defect, the only way to establish
the defective nature of the product is to show either that the
designer was unreasonable in adopting an unsafe design6 or
that those in charge of marketing acted unreasonably in pro-
viding an inadequate warning of potential dangers. 7
2 Id. at 163-64. It should be noted that this version of the facts was controverted
by the testimony of the plant engineer, who denied receiving any advice about lateral
sway bracing or warning that the crane might fall. Id. at 164.
'Id. at 164.
Id. at 165.
'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 402A (1965). Kentucky adopted this section
in Dealers Transp. Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1966).
6 This must be compared with the relative ease of establishing a manufacturing
defect when a product breaks or malfunctions causing injury. In this type case, when
only one item in an entire product line is attacked, courts are willing to apply the
presumption that a malfunctioning product was defective when manufactured. On the
other hand, when a design defect is alleged, an entire product line is challenged and it
must be established that the chosen design was, in fact, defective. See Henderson,
Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of
Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531 (1973).
7 The requirement of adequate warning has generally been applied to unavoidably
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This interplay between negligence and strict liability has
been recognized by both the Second Restatement and case law,
which provide that the standard applicable to alleged design
defects is essentially one of reasonable care.' The Kentucky
Supreme Court, in Jones v. Hutchinson Mfg., Inc., said:
We think it apparent that when the claim asserted is
against a manufacturer for deficient design of its product the
distinction between the so-called strict liability principle and
negligence is of no practical significance so far as the stan-
dard of conduct required of the defendant is concerned. In
either event the standard required is reasonable care.'
Consistent with this view, the Court approached the alleg-
edly defective crane design in Bohnert from the perspective of
reasonableness, and held that an adequate warning might ob-
viate unreasonable danger; i.e., a warning can establish reason-
able care where negligence might otherwise be found.'0 In re-
manding the case, the Court articulated the warning require-
ment as a duty to afford "adequate notice of the danger and
possible consequences of using or even misusing the equip-
ment, except for those dangers and consequences which the
jury believes were obvious. . . ."' This formulation raises an
interesting issue on remand because the representatives of the
designers did not contend that they warned of danger, but
rather, warned of the necessity for bracing to prevent the han-
ger rods from breaking. The manufacturer and seller admitted
that they did not mention the extent of the danger because
they felt it was obvious.' 2 Thus the circuit court is left to decide
two issues: (1) whether the danger was obvious and (2) if not,
whether the defendants' instructions constituted a sufficient
warning. 3
dangerous products such as drugs. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Com-
ment k (1965).
1E.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978); Pike v. Frank G. Hough
Co., 467 P.2d 229 (Cal. 1970); Garst v. General Motors Corp., 484 P.2d 47 (Kan. 1971).
But see Blevins v. Cushman Motors, 551 S.W.2d 602, 607-08 (Mo. 1977).
502 S.W.2d 66, 69-70 (Ky. 1973).
569 S.W.2d at 165, citing Ulrich v. Kasco Abrasives Co., 532 S.W.2d 197 (Ky.
1976).
" Id. at 166.
" Id. at 165.
'3 In another products liability case last year, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
1978-79]
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B. Intervening Modification and the Lapse of Time
In Ford Motor Co. v. McCamish, 14 the plaintiff was injured
when the brakes failed while he was driving his employer's
truck. The truck had been manufactured by defendant-
appellant, Ford Motor Company, and the brake system had
been repaired shortly before the accident by the other defen-
dant, Blancett Motor Company, an authorized Ford dealer.
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff of $129,415 against
Ford and Blancett, apportioned 30% - 70% respectively. 5 Al-
though both defendants appealed, the plaintiff's claim against
Blancett was settled, leaving the Court of Appeals to deal only
with the issues raised by Ford Motor Company.
After reviewing the evidence, the court reversed the judg-
ment, noting that the truck was five years old at the time of
the accident and that the portion of the braking system which
failed had been repaired and modified shortly before."6 Under
these ciicumstances, the court concluded that the plaintiff
failed to establish that the brakes were defective at the time
of sale, and held the "trial court erred in submitting to the jury
the question whether the braking system was unreasonably
dangerous 'as the result of its design, manufacture or assembly'
by Ford. 1 7 This decision is consistent with the recently en-
acted Product Liability Act,'" which creates a rebuttable pre-
sumption that a product is not defective if the injury occurs
adopted a different approach to the warning issue. In Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Boyd,
- S.W.2d - (Ky. Ct. App. 1978), the plaintiff was injured by a revolver (designed
with no safety mechanism) which the owner had fully loaded, contrary to a printed
warning furnished when the gun was purchased. In finding that such a warning could
not counteract the inherent danger in the design of this weapon, the court concluded
that the jury was justified in determining that the manufacturer had breached its duty
of reasonable care in the adoption of this design.
" 559 S.W.2d 507 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
1' The jury is permitted to apportion damages between joint tortfeasors by virtue
of Ky. REv. STAT. § 454.040 (1975) [hereinafter cited as KRS]. See Orr v. Coleman,
455 S.W.2d 59 (Ky. 1970); Cox v. Cooper, 510 S.W.2d 530 (Ky. 1974).
II 559 S.W.2d at 511.
" Id. It should be noted that the evidence on this point was somewhat conflicting.
Two expert witnesses called by the plaintiff testified that the brake failure was the
result of improper design by Ford. The court nevertheless found that this evidence was
outweighed by the testimony of other experts coupled with the age of the truck and
the fact of its recent repair. Id. at 510.
11 Product Liability Act of Kentucky, KRS §§ 411.300-.350 (Supp. 1978).
[Vol. 67
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more than five years after sale of the product to the first con-
sumer. 9
II. THE PRODUCT LABILIY ACT OF KENTUCKY
In adopting the Product Liability Act, Kentucky becomes
only the fourth state to codify standards of recovery for such
actions." In general, the Act creates two evidentiary presump-
tions for determining defectiveness, sets limits on recoverable
damages, recognizes alteration and contributory negligence by
the consumer as defenses, and mandates protection for certain
intermediate distributors of products.21
A. The Call for Products Liability Legislation
Clearly, this legislation is the result of a growing concern
throughout the nation with judicial treatment of products lia-
bility claims.22 Manufacturers and their insurers have ex-
pressed concern over the increased cost and decreased availa-
bility of product liability insurance, presumably resulting from
the growing willingness of many courts to impose strict liability
in a variety of situations.23
Although most commentators recognize the need for uni-
formity and predictability in products liability actions, there
is little agreement on how best to achieve this goal. Some feel
the problem merits federal legislation,2 while others believe it
has been overstated and requires no action whatever. 25 In
1 KRS § 411.310(1) (Supp. 1978).
See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-80-127.5, 13-21-401 to 405 (Supp. 1978); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 30.900-.915 (1977); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-15-1 to 6 (1977).
2 See KRS § 411.300-.350 (Supp. 1978).
22 See generally, Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground,
56 N.C. L. REV. 643 (1978); Henderson, Products Liability: The Gathering Momentum
Toward Statutory Reform, 1 CORP. L. REv. 41 (1978).
n For a discussion of the position of several insurers and manufacturers on this
issue, see Kircher, Products Liability-The Defense Position, 44 INs. COUNsEL J. 276
(1977).
2, See Henderson, Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Product Design: A Pro-
posed Statutory Reform, 56 N.C. L. REv. 625 (1978).
21 As demand for statutory reform of product liability law increased, the Federal
Interagency Task Force on Product Liability was convened. In its report, the Task
Force found that the magnitude of the insurance problem was exaggerated and recom-
mended further study before drastic action to change the law is taken. U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY-FINAL REPORT (1977).
1978-79]
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adopting the Act, Kentucky's General Assembly articulated its
preference for legislative action over judge-made law in this
area.
B. Structure of the Act
1. The Presumptions
A significant change effected by.the Act is the creation of
two rebuttable presumptions. First, a product is presumed not
defective if the injury occurs more than five years after sale of
the product to the first consumer or more than eight years after
the date of manufacture. Second, a product is presumed not
defective if its design conforms to the state of the art when
designed and manufactured .2 Although the legislature pro-
vided some relief to potential defendants through these pre-
sumptions, the Act does not bar any action completely via a
statute of limitations. An injured plaintiff can maintain an
action regardless of the age of the.product as long as there is
sufficient evidence to rebut the statutory presumptions that
the product is not defective.2
However, the second presumption could severely limit
plaintiffs who seek to recover for defective design, since it re-
quires a directed verdict in favor of a manufacturer who estab-
lishes that a design "conformed to the generally recognized and
prevailing standards or the state of the art in existence at the
time the design was prepared and the product was manufac-
tured." 1 The statute does not address the question of whether
a plaintiff can introduce evidence of the feasibility or practical-
ity of changing the product to make it safer, or whether a
showing that the product met industry-wide norms will conclu-
sively decide the issue in favor of the defendant. Some courts
26 KRS §§ 411.310(1) - (2) (Supp. 1978).
27 But see COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-127.5 (Supp. 1978) (providing a three-year
statute of limitations on all actions except breach of warranty); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.905
(1977) (statute of limitations of two years from date of injury or eight years from date
of first purchase); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3(1) (1977) (state of repose ofsix years from
date of purchase or ten years from date of manufacture).
KRS § 411.310(2) (Supp. 1978). For a discussion of the "state of the art" defense
in products liability actions, see Phillips, The Standard for Determining Defectiveness




have applied a broad definition of "state of the art" and admit-
ted evidence of alternative designs regardless of industry prac-
tice. 2 Although Kentucky courts have not yet faced this issue,
adherence to the spirit of product liability law would support
this approach.
2. Alterations and Contributory Negligence
The Act also places further limitations on the manufac-
turer's liability. Consistent with existing law, it provides that
a manufacturer is liable for injuries caused by its product only
if the product was in its "original, unaltered and unmodified
condition."3 This does not apply to modifications made in ac-
cordance with specifications or instructions furnished by the
manufacturer, or to ordinary wear and tear. However, product
alteration does include failure to observe routine care and
maintenance.
Contributory negligence is also made a defense under the
Act, clearly expanding the defenses available in product ac-
tions. Formerly, contributory negligence-type defenses were
limited to misuse of a product, or continued use with knowl-
edge of a defect.31 Under the new statutory scheme, additional
types of plaintiff action may exonerate manufacturers. For ex-
ample, in the Bohnert case the plaintiff had been jogging the
crane which ultimately fell and caused his injury. "Jogging"
was described as the operation of pushing the forward control
button and then the reverse button, causing the load to swing.
The Kentucky Supreme Court attached no significance to this
since it is comparable to the normal practice of stopping the
" See, e.g., Badorek v. General Motors Corp., 90 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1970); Sutkowski
v. Universal Marion Corp., 281 N.E.2d 749 (Ill. 1972).
- KRS § 411.320(1) (Supp. 1978). See Cox v. General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d
197 (Ky. 1974); Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 251 (1972). The Second Restatement imposes
strict liability only if the product "is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
oF ToRr § 402A(1)(b) (1965).
1' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRS § 402A, Comment h, n (1965); Epstein,
Products Liability: Defenses Based on Plaintiff's Conduct, 1968 UTAH L. REV. 267;
Levine, Buyer's Conduct as Affecting the Extent of Manufacturer's Liability in
Warranty, 52 MmN. L. Rav. 627 (1968); Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use,
Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. Rzv. 93 (1972).
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crane by pushing the reverse button when it is going forward.2
However, it is possible that this same practice could be viewed
as contributory negligence under the statute for "fail[ing] to
exercise ordinary care"33 in causing the crane to fall from the
runway.
With the defense of contributory negligence available to
manufacturers in product actions, many kinds of conduct on
the part of injured consumers may operate to bar recovery.
This seems inconsistent with the policies of compensation, loss
spreading, and reducing the overall societal cost of accidents,
all of which underlie the imposition of strict liability for defec-
tive products. It will be necessary for the courts to define ex-
actly what constitutes contributory negligence under the Act in
order to protect both consumer and manufacturer.
3. Protection of Intermediaries
The final substantive provision of the Act exonerates inter-
mediaries (retailers, wholesalers, and distributors) from liabil-
ity if the manufacturer is subject to the court's jurisdiction, the
intermediary had no actual or constructive notice of the prod-
uct's defect, and the product was sold in its original condition.
The section places on the intermediary the burden of showing
by a preponderance of the evidence that these factors are pres-
ent, and serves two important functions. First, it retains the
policy favoring compensation of an injured plaintiff at the ex-
pense of the intermediary when the manufacturer cannot be
reached. Second, it eliminates the need for additional litigation
in the situation where an intermediary originally held liable to
the plaintiff would then claim indemnity from the manufac-
turer. The Act thus insulates the intermediary from all suits
except those in which it can be adjudged wholly liable.
III. DEFAMATION
Three decisions in the area of defamation were handed
down by Kentucky's appellate courts in the past year. The
32 569 S.W.2d 161, 163 (Ky. 1978).
*3 KRS § 411.320(3) (Supp. 1978).
11 KRS § 411.340 (Supp. 1978).
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Court of Appeals formally established a negligence standard for
defamation of a private individual, 5 and applied the United
States Supreme Court's standard of actual malice for defama-
tion of a public figure." In a third case, 7 the Court of Appeals
extended to a local air board a statutory privilege for legislative
bodies.
A. Application of Supreme Court Standards
Since the landmark decision of New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,38 the law of defamation has been in an almost con-
stant state of refinement. In New York Times the United
States Supreme Court drastically departed from the previous
common-law approach and required that where a public offi-
cial was the subject of the publication, there could be no liabil-
ity "unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual
malice' - that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."39 This stan-
dard was extended to public figures in Curtis Publishing Co.
v. Butts,4" and was expanded still further in Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc. to include private persons involved in mat-
ters of public interest.41 Whether the defendant published with
"reckless disregard for the truth" is measured by the standard
of St. Amant v. Thompson: whether the person "entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of his publication."
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.43 the Court was again asked
to formulate a standard for defamaton of a private individual.
The Court impliedly overruled Rosenbloom, holding that de-
spite the public interest involved, the New York Times actual
malice standard was not required when a private individual
was defamed.44 The Court left to the individual states the mat-
' E.W. Scripps Co. v. Cholmondelay, 569 S.W.2d 700 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
1' Sparks v. Boone, 560 S.W.2d 236 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
Gray v. Central Bank and Trust Co., 562 S.W.2d 656 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
3, Id. at 279-80.
" 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
"1 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
42 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
"418 U.S. 323 (1974).
" Id. at 347.
1978-79]
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ter of setting the standard to be applied in actions involving
private individuals, saying, "[S]o long as they do not impose
liability without fault, the states can define for themselves the
appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster
of defamatory falsehoods injurious to a private individual."' 5
It was against this backdrop that the Kentucky Court of
Appeals decided E. W. Scripps Co. v. Cholmondelay.16 The
case involved two newspaper articles about a fight between two
schoolboys that ultimately resulted in the death of one of the
boys. The stories did not name the surviving child, but de-
scribed the incident in considerable detail. The second story
stated that the decedent's head "had been pounded over and
over again against the pavement, and . . .[that the victim]
had been savagely beaten into insensibility."4 The mother of
the surviving boy, as next friend, sued the newspaper's publish-
ing company, its editor, and the reporter for libel. At trial, the
jury was instructed that the defendants were liable if negligent;
a verdict for the plaintiff was returned and an award of $32,500
in conpensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages
was made. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment but
denied punitive damages. 8
The appellate court relied on Gertz as support for its adop-
tion of a negligence standard in actions for defamation of pri-
vate individuals. 9 In so doing, Kentucky joins a majority of
43 Id. The Court recognized that the state interest involved in libel is compensa-
tion of individuals for harm inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood.
46 569 S.W.2d 700 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
4 Id. at 702.
Is In its opinion, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that the plaintiff had been
defamed, even though he was not named in the article, because persons familiar with
the incident could easily recognize him from the article's account. Id.
11 The court in Cholmondelay did not elaborate on what application of the negli-
gence standard entails. At trial, the jury was instructed as follows: "If you believe from
the evidence that the statements contained in the article. . . were false, and that the
defendants were negligent in investigating, researching, reporting and publishing the
article, then the law is for the plaintiff. . . ." 569 S.W.2d at 703. At least one court
has adopted a "journalistic malpractice" test, wherein "[t]he standard to be applied
in determining such negligence is the conduct of the reasonably careful publisher or
broadcaster in the community or in similar communities under the existing circum-
stances. . . ." Gobin v. Globe Publishing, 531 P.2d 76, 84 (Kan. 1975).
Another court seeking to define the negligence standard adopted the position of
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 580B (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975), which states:
One who publishes a false and defamatory communication concerning a
[Vol. 67
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jurisdictions that have adopted such a standard. This places a
greater burden on news gatherers and publishers to assure the
accuracy of their reporting, and increases the motivation for
self-censorship.'0 However, if a negligence standard is ever ap-
propriate in such actions, limiting its application to the private
individual is consistent with the purpose of a defamation ac-
tion: protection of a person's reputation. Clearly, the private
individual is more in need of this protection than the public
figure, who, to some extent, assumes the risk of negligent dam-
age to his or her reputation.
That this policy of protecting the individual's reputation
must yield when a public figure is involved was recognized in
Sparks v. Boone.1 In that case, the plaintiff, an unsuccessful
candidate for the state legislature, sued a newspaper and au-
thor for publication of a letter to the editor that criticized the
plaintiffs qualifications for office. The Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals noted that the plaintiff, as a candidate for elective office,
was a public figure, and adhered to the New York Times stan-
dard requiring actual malice for defamation of such a person.52
private person, or concerning a public official or public figure in relation to
a purely private matter not affecting his conduct, fitness or role in his public
capacity, is subject to liability if, but only if, he
(a) knows that the statement is false and that it defames the other,
(b) acts in reckless disregard of these matters, or
(c) acts negligently in failing to ascertain them.
Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 350 A.2d 688 (Md. 1976).
For a discussion of state court application of Gertz and thoughts on the imposition
of a negligence standard, see Collins and Drushal, The Reaction of the State Courts
to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 28 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 306 (1978); Comment, 29 VAND.
L. REv. 1431 (1976).
State courts that have adopted a negligence standard include: Peagler v. Phoe-
nix Newspapers, Inc., 560 P.2d 1216 (Ariz. 1977); Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park
Corp., 543 P.2d 1356 (Hawaii 1975); Troman v. Wood, 340 N.E.2d 292 (Ill. 1975); Gobin
v. Globe Publishing, 531 P.2d 76 (Kan. 1975); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 350 A.2d
688 (Md. 1976); Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 330 N.E.2d 161 (Mass. 1975);
Thomas H. Maloney & Sons, Inc. v. E.W. Scripps Co., 334 N.E.2d 494 (Ohio Ct. App.
1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 883 (1975); Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d
85 (Okla. 1976); Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977); Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 546 P.2d 81 (Wash.
1976). Contra, Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 538 P.2d 450 (Colo. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1025; AAFCO Heating & Air Cond. Co. v. Northwest Publications,
Inc., 321 N.E.2d 580 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974).
51 560 S.W.2d 236 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
52 Id. at 237-38.
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The court pointed out that the First Amendment privilege is
sufficient to protect publications concerning candidates for
public office, where the need for unrestricted debate is great.5 3
It is difficult to imagine a case better suited than Sparks
for First Amendment protection. The publication complained
of was a medium available to all citizens in the course of a
political campaign: a letter to the editor of the local newspaper.
Many important issues are aired in this manner, as it is one
significant way in which the average citizen gains access to the
media. Although there is a strong societal interest in prevent-
ing libel, the requirement of actual malice serves to encourage
the free flow of ideas in this public arena. The Sparks court
wisely accorded great freedom to both writer and newspaper in
the political debate setting, stating: "There must be limits
placed on the right of individuals to attack public figures and
candidates for public office, but such individuals are always
subject to fair comment and criticism when they attempt to
put themselves in a good light with the public. For the criticism
to be actionable, however, malice must be shown." 4
B. Legislative Immunity
In Gray v. Central Bank & Trust Co.,55 the Court of Ap-
peals recognized the privilege of quasi-legislative board mem-
bers as an absolute defense to liability for statements made by
them within the scope of their duties. Plaintiff in Gray owned
a construction company that bid on a project to the Lexington-
Fayette Urban County Airport Board. One of the airport board
members, the late Garvice Kincaid, was skeptical of plaintiff's
ability to complete the job, and conducted an investigation.
Ultimately, he disclosed the report of this investigation to the
board, and the contract was awarded to another contractor. 6
The plaintiff brought suit for defamation and interference with
a prospective business relationship.
Id. at 238.
" Id. at 239.
562 S.W.2d 656 (Ky. Ct. App.. 1978).
The facts of this case are complex. Bids for the project were solicited twice, with
the award going to the lowest bidder of the second group. The plaintiff was low bidder
on the first solicitation. Id. at 657.
[Vol. 67
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The Court of Appeals found no liability because defendant
enjoyed a statutory privilege as a member of the airport
board.57 The court based its decision on two state statutes: one
granting absolute immunity to members of city legislative bod-
ies, and another granting status as a legislative body to an
airport board." The only other interpretation of the immunity
statute was in Jacobs v. Underwood,"9 a case granting immun-
ity to a city commission. Thus, in this case of first impression,
the court extended the protection of absolute immunity from
defamation suits to include lesser municipal bodies.
However, the extension of absolute immunity was unnec-
essary in this case. The opinion indicates that two other
grounds also supported the decision. First, the action for slan-
der against Kincaid did not survive his death, and sec6nd, the
plaintiffs failed to establish the elements of interference with
a contractual relationship.'" Further, and perhaps more signifi-
cantly, the facts clearly established that a qualified immunity
would have protected the defendant in this case. As the court
noted, "[Kincaid] was acting within the scope of his duties as
a member of the air board, in as much as he was seeking to
insure that the contract was awarded to the lowest and best
bidder."" Thus, the requirements of a qualified privilege were
satisfied: the actions were reasonable and the purpose proper.
Such a qualified immunity for public officers within'the
general scope of authority is supported by the Second Restate-
ment of Torts." In his concurring opinion in Gray, Judge Park
37 Id. at 658.
- KRS § 84.050(5) (1971), provides: "For anything said in debate, members of the
general council are entitled to the same immunities and protection allowed to members
of the general assembly." KRS § 183.132(2) (1971), provides, in part: "The board shall
constitute a legislative body for the purposes of KRS 183.630 to 183.740." (These
sections deal with the board's ability to issue revenue bonds).
" 484 S.W.2d 855 (Ky. 1972).
" 562 S.W.2d at 658-59.
" Id. at 658.
12 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRs § 895D (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973), provides,
in part:
(3) A public officer acting within the general scope of his authority is not
subject to tort liability for an administrative act or omission if
(a) He is immune because engaged in the exercise of a discretion-
ary function.




endorsed the Restatement position and questioned the wisdom
of extending absolute privilege in this manner. 3 On balance,
this appears to be the sounder position. As government be-
comes more complex, the number of boards and agencies neces-
sarily increases. Although persons who serve the community as
board members should be afforded some protection, those who
act reasonably within the scope of their positions would receive
adequate protection from the Restateinent position. Adoption
of this standard would decrease the risk of defamation to indi-
viduals for whom the absolute privilege affords no recourse.
IV. DUTY
During the past year, Kentucky's appellate courts had a
number of opportunities to re-examine the concept of duty. In
the four most significant cases decided during that period, the
courts imposed a duty on the defendant in only one instance:
a hospital was charged with a duty to admit an emergency
patient. 4 In the remaining cases the courts refused to expand
existing duties owed by shopkeepers," owners of residential
swimming pools,66 and attorneys. 7
A. Duty of a Hospital to Admit a Patient
In Richard v. Adair Hospital Foundation Corp., 65 the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of sum-
mary judgment in favor of a hospital that allegedly refused to
admit plaintiff's child. Testimony indicated that the child had
been refused admission to the hospital's emergency room twice,
and subsequently died of pneumonia in another hospital. The
defendants claimed they were entitled to summary judgment
in the wrongful death action because the element of causation
had not been established. The appellate court disagreed, find-
ing that medical testimony presented was sufficient to estab-
(c) He is not negligent because he acted as a reasonable prudent
person in the exercise of his discretion.
63 562 S.W.2d at 659-61.
" Richard v. Adair Hosp. Foundation Corp., 566 S.W.2d 791 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
Adkins v. Ashland Supermarkets, Inc., 569 S.W.2d 698 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
68 Grimes v. Hettinger, 566 S.W.2d 769 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
67 Hill v. Willmott, 561 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
566 S.W.2d 791 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
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lish a jury question on the issue of causation. The court indi-
cated that the hospital could be held liable for its failure to
admit the decedent if the jury believed the evidence estab-
lished a causal connection.69
Arguably, the court's position in Richard represents a de-
parture from the previous "no duty to admit" standard articu-
lated in Hill v. Ohio County.70 In that case, a pregnant woman
was refused admission to a public hospital when a nurse could
not secure permission to admit her from either of two doctors
admitted to practice in the hospital. The woman later died
after giving birth at home, but the Court found no breach of
duty by either the hospital or nurse.71 However, the Hill Court
noted that "[i]n the instant case, the decedent was not admit-
ted to the hospital nor was the element of critical emergency
apparent. ' 7- Further, Hill does not appear to involve nonad-
mission to an emergency room, and thus the question of liabil-
ity for emergency nonadmission was reserved.73
The issue of whether a hospital has a duty to admit a
patient has received much recent attention. 4 The past two
decades have produced a tremendous increase in demand for
emergency room service, forcing hospitals to become selective,
treating only bona fide emergencies and turning others away.75
The courts have recognized the hospitals' dilemma and have
"1 Id. at 794.
76 468 S.W.2d 306 (Ky. 1970).
7' Id. at 309.
SId.
The opinion does not indicate whether the decedent sought admission to an
emergency room. The hospital is described as a one-floor building; quite possibly there
were no separate emergency facilities.
71 See, e.g., Powers, Hospital Emergency Service and the Open Door, 66 MICH. L.
REv. 1455 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Powers]; Gold, Emergency Room Medical
Treatment: Right or Privilege?, 36 ALBANY L. REv. 526 (1972); Note, Must A Private
Hospital Be A Good Samaritan?, 18 U. FLA. L. REV. 475 (1965); Note, The Tort
Liability of Hospitals for Refusals to Render Emergency Aid, 4 MEM. ST. L. REv. 108
(1973); Comment, 14 STA. L. Rev. 910 (1962).
"' The American Hospital Association reported a 1975% increase in emergency
room services between 1954 and 1964. This increase is often due to public misuse of
emergency facilities. Some patients with nonemergency illnesses seek service in emer-
gency rooms because of hospitalization insurance policies that cover emergency room
care but nt regular visits to a physician. Others visit emergency rooms because private
physicians' hours are limited, while the emergency room is always available. Powers,
supra note 74, at 1455 n.3.
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not imposed liability for refusal to admit the nonemergency
patient. There have been several cases involving private hospi-
tals, in which courts have acknowledged the right of a private
hospital to reject any-applicant in a nonemergency situation.7 6
However, decisions involving public hospitals imply that they,
too, have the right to refuse. 7
Conversely, courts have not hesitated to impose a duty ofi
hospitals to admit the bona fide emergency cases.7 This willing-
ness stems from two concerns. First, by maintaining an emer-
gency room the hospital has induced the public's reliance that
emergency care will be rendered.78 Second, time is crucial in
the emergency situation, and refusal by a hospital can have
extreme, even fatal, consequences. In the leading case of
Wilmington General Hospital v. Manlove, '"the Supreme Court
of Delaware refused to grant summary judgment in favor of a
hospital that failed to admit plaintiff's four-month-old child.
The court held that the hospital would be liable only if an
"unmistakable emergency" existed when admission was re-
fused." Thus, the issue in Manlove was whether an experienced
nurse should have known that the child's symptoms indicated
an emergency.
Similarly, in the Richard case, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals identified the issue for the jury as whether the hospital
was negligent in refusing to admit the child when an unmistak-
able emergency existed.82 Even if an emergency situation ex-
isted, there would be no liability unless the hospital was negli-
gent in failing to perceive the emergency. Such a result will not
burden hospitals unduly, as the standard of care required in
71 See, e.g., Birmingham Baptist Hosp. v. Crews, 157 So. 224 (Ala. 1934); Costa
v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 254 P.2d 85 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953); Le Juene Rd. Hosp.,
Inc. v. Watson, 171 So.2d 202 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
n See, e.g., McDonald v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432 (1876) rev'd on other
grounds; Colby v. Carney Hosp., 254 N.E.2d 407 (Mass. 1969); Van Campen v. Olean
.Gen. Hosp., 205 N.Y.S. 554 (App. Div. 1924), affl'd, 147 N.E. 219; New Biloxi Hosp.,
Inc.. v. Frazier, 146 So.2d 882 (Miss. 1962).
78 See, e.g., Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 174 A.2d 135 (Del. 1961); Barcia
v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 241 N.Y.S.2d 373 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
11 Powers, supra note 74, at 1483-84.
10 174 A.2d 135 (Del. 1961).
11 Id. at 140.
12 566 S.W.2d at 793.
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this situation is the same as that generally required of medical
personnel to avoid malpractice liability. No duty to admit ex-
ists when the emergency is hot apparent to the reasonably pru-
dent medical practitioner. Under this standard, hospitals can
continue to withhold emergency service when it-is determined
that no emergency exists, and the critically ill patient will be
more likely to have- access to needed hospital care.
D. Shopkeeper's Duty to Patrons
In Adkins v. Ashland Supermarkets, Inc., the Kentucky
Court of Appeals refused to impose a duty on a storekeeper to
protect a patron from an armed robber. The plaintiff was in
defendant's grocery store when it was robbed at gunpoint. Dur-
ing the robbery the store owner allegedly disobeyed instruc-
tions of the robber and verbally quarreled with him. The plain-
tiff claimed that the storekeeper's acts provoked the robber
into shooting and injuring the plaintiff. The court recognized
a shopkeeper's affirmative duty to maintain reasonably safe
business premises, but concluded that this duty does not re-
quire one to comply with the demands of an armed robber.8
The court found that "a storekeeper is not an insurer for the
safety of his patrons and is not required at his peril to keep the
premises reasonably safe.""
The Adkins decision protects a proprietor from liability to
patrons injured during a robbery, but the opinion is unclear as
to whether this immunity is absolute. The court's language
suggests that the proprietor is immune for acts consistent with
a desire to protect self or property.8 However, this broad lan-
guage must be evaluated in terms of the facts in Adkins, where
the proprietor offered only verbal resistance. The court recog-
nized that this could be significant, stating that "under most
planes of rationality [verbal resistance] would not involve the
same degree of danger as would physical actions. '8 7
Although the court seems to hold that the shopkeeper







owed no duty to the injured patron, a more plausible interpre-
tation is that the shopkeeper's original duty of reasonable care
continued but was not breached. Such an interpretation as-
sumes that Kentucky has not rejected the reasonableness stan-
dard contained in the Second Restatement. Under that ap-
proach, one is negligent if one realizes or should realize that an
act involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through
the conduct of the third person. 8 Liability is not excused even
though a third person's conduct is itself negligent, intentionally
tortious, or criminal."9
A reasonableness standard such as that suggested by the
Restatement has been adopted in at least three jurisdictions.
In dictum of a case factually similar to Adkins, the Texas Su-
preme Court explained its approach: "[U]nder the circum-
stances of the instant case the defendant was privileged to act
in-defense of his property. His interest and privilege in that
respect had social value. As the social value of the interest
imperiled increases, the magnitude of the risk which is justified
diminishes."9 Application of such a standard would support
the result in Adkins, as the court's opinion indicates that the
storekeeper was not negligent. Although the court did not con-
sider whether the storekeeper's acts increased the risk of harm
to the plaintiff, it may have been influenced by the fact that
the storekeeper was willing to expose himself and his wife (both
of whom were shot - the storekeeper fatally) to the same dan-
ger to which the plaintiff was exposed.
A reasonableness standard would be appropriate for evalu-
ating the behavior of defendants in similar cases. Since a store-
91 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRrs § 302B (1965), states: "An act or an omission
may be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it involves an unreasonable
risk of harm to another through the conduct of the other or a third person which is
intended to cause harm, even though such conduct is criminal."
'" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRS § 449 (1965), states: "If the likelihood that a
third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards which
makes the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally
tortious, or criminal does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused
thereby."
H Kelly v. Kroger Co., 484 F.2d 1362 (10th Cir. 1973) (construing Kansas law);
Genovay v. Fox, 143 A.2d 229 (N.J. 1958).rev'd on other grounds, 149 A.2d 212 (1959);
Helms v. Harris, 281 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. 1955).
"1 Helms v. Harris, 281 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1955).
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keeper cannot adequately plan for or control the course of an
armed robbery, liability should be limited to those acts which
are manifestly unreasonable. It is not enough to ask whether
the risk of harm to the patron was increased. Liability should
arise only when the act of the proprietor cannot be construed
as reasonable under the existing circumstances. To hold other-
wise would be to place an unrealistic demand on a merchant
in a crisis situation.
E. Owners of Residential Swimming Pools
In Grimes v. Hettinger, 2 the Kentucky Court of Appeals'
found that the owner of a private, residential swimming pool
has no duty to discover the peril of a social guest in danger of
drowning. Plaintiffs decedent was a twelve-year-old girl who
drowned in defendant's swimming pool while attending a
party. The court noted that at common law there is no duty to
rescue another unless the would-be rescuer and the person in
danger have some special relationship, such as host and guest.
However, it limited this duty to those instances when the
"rescuer" knew or should have known of the other's peril . 3
The court rejected plaintiffs claim that defendant had a
duty to provide a lifeguard, saying this requirement does not
apply to residential pools. 4 Since the decedent was shown to
have been a bright girl and a good swimmer, the court limited
defendant's duty to include only responsibility to control the
girl's activities to prevent an unreasonable risk of harm, and
to rescue if the defendant knew or should have known that she
was drowning.15 In so holding, the court adopted the majority
position imposing no special duty on an owner of a residential
swimming pool.9
12 566 S.W.2d 769 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
"Id. at 775.
" Id. at 774.
Id.
" See, e.g., Hansen v. Richey, 46 Cal. Rptr. 909 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (pool owner
held to a standard of reasonable care); Handiboe v. McCarthy, 151 S.E.2d 905 (Ga.
1966) (where the host is not negligent, no duty to rescue imposed).
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F. Liability of Attorney to Doctor for Pursuing Medical.
Malpractice Claim
In Hill v. Willmott,97 the Court of Appeals refused to allow
a non-client to maintain a negligence action against an attor-
ney. Plaintiff was a doctor who was sued for malpractice. The
attorney whose clients brought the malpractice action desired
to maintain a good relationship with the defendant-doctor; he
therefore arranged for suit to be filed with another attorney's
name appearing on the complaint. This attorney handled no
part of the malpractice suit, although he gave permission for
his name to be used and agreed to forward all correspondence
concerning the suit to the actual attorney. The plaintiffs agreed
to this arrangement. 8
The doctor was granted summary judgment in the mal-
practice action, and subsequently sued the attorney of record,
alleging negligence in institution of the malpractice action."
The doctor argued that under the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility, an attorney has a duty to avoid even the appearance
of professional impropriety.10 This duty, imposed on Kentucky
attorneys by the Rules of the Supreme Court, was allegedly
breached when the attorney instituted the medical malpractice
action. 0'
The court held that this duty does not extend to individu-
als seeking civil redress, but is for disciplinary purposes only.
The court stated: "All we are holding is that the duty set forth
in the Code and the Rule establishes the minimum level of
competence for the protection of the public and a violation
thereof does not necessarily give rise to a cause of action."'0 2
The court explained that its holding did not foreclose all negli-
gence actions by those not in privity with the attorney, but
limited such suits to those intended to be benefited by the
attorney's actions.
The court's holding apparently means that third parties
who were not intended beneficiaries are limited to actions for
' 561 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
" Id. at 332.
"Id.
11 ABA CODE OF PROFESSioNAL RESPONsmmY, Ethical Consideration No. 9-6.
SRULES OF ThE SUPREME COURT 3.130.
"' 561 S.W.2d at 334.
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malicious prosecution.'0 3 This is a significant limitation as the
elements of malicious prosecution, malice and lack of probable
cause, are far more difficult to establish than the elements of
negligence." 4 Because a negligence standard would deter attor-
neys from accepting cases if less than sure of success, some
meritorious claims would be left unpursued. The public policy
favoring access to the courts requires adherence to the malice
standard in this area; the attorney who acts reasonably and in
good faith should be protected even when unsuccessful.
Hill is especially significant in light of the proliferation of
medical malpractice actions and the recent trend among physi-
cians to countersue unsuccessful plaintiffs and their attorneys.
An opposite result in Hill would have given physicians support
in their attempt to decrease the number of malpractice actions
by counter-attack. Such a result would also have been a disin-
centive to attorneys to represent plaintiffs in malpractice ac-
tions. Adherence to the malicious prosecution standard assures
that a plaintiffs claim will not be lost because no lawyer will
take the case. On the other hand, the action for malicious
prosecution remains as a safeguard for any defendant who is
sued frivolously or maliciously.
V. MISCELLANEOUS
The remaining cases do not fall into one of the previous
sections nor do they follow any particular pattern, yet each has
significance for the Kentucky practitioner. In two cases the
Kentucky Court of Appeals clarified the standard for inten-
tional interference with a contractual relationship.0 5 In a final
case, the Court of Appeals interpreted a statutory amendment
delimiting lawful actions by a shopkeeper in detention of an
alleged shoplifter.''
'In For an example of Kentucky's treatment of an action for malicious prosecution,
see Harter v. Lewis Stores, 240 S.W.2d 86 (Ky. 1951).
I" W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRmS § 119 (4th ed. 1971).
10 Carmichael-Lynch-Nolan Advertising Agency, Inc. v. Bennett & Associates,
561 S.W.2d 99 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977); Henkin, Inc. v. Berea Bank & Trust Co., 556
S.W.2d 420 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
'a0 Super X Drugs of Kentucky, Inc. v. Rice, 554 S.W.2d 903 (Ky. App. 1977).
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A. Intentional Interference with a Contractual Relationship
Kentucky's Court of Appeals decided two cases in which
defendants were held liable for intentional interference with a
contractual relationship. In Carmichael-Lynch-Nolan Adver-
tising Agency, Inc. v. Bennett & Associates,' the court at-
tempted to clarify the law in this area and adopted the position
of the Restatement of Torts. However, in Henkin, Inc. v. Berea
Bank & Trust Co.,"I the analysis is inconsistent with
Carmichael and appears to be a retreat from the Restatement
position and a return to the previous standard.
For many years Kentucky adhered to the minority posi-
tion, recognizing no cause of action for intentional interference
with a contractual relationship unless the breach of contract
was induced by fraud or coercion." 9 This requirement was later
relaxed, and recovery was allowed against one who maliciously
or unjustifiably induced another to break a contract, with no
showing of fraud or coercion.110 In Carmichael-Lynch-Nolan
Advertising Agency, Inc. v. Bennett & Associates,"' the Court
of Appeals eliminated these requirements and adopted the Re-
statement position, which allows recovery against a third party
who purposefully induces a breach of contract. The court
stated, "We feel confident that . . . the Restatement of Torts
§ 766 presents the correct guidelines. 112 Thus, the plaintiff was
entitled to recover against a competitor who induced plaintiff's
client to breach its advertising contract with no showing of
fraud or illegality in the inducement.13
Although Carmichael appeared to clarify the law in this
area, the opinion of the Court of Appeals in Henkin, Inc. v.
" 561 S.w.2d 99 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
566 S.W.2d 420 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
Brooks v. Patterson, 29 S.W.2d 26 (Ky. 1930).
" Derby Road Bldg. Co. v. Commonwealth, 317 S.W.2d 891 (Ky. 1958) rev'd on
other grounds, 375 S.W.2d 392 (1964).
" 561 S.W.2d at 102. RESTATEMENT OF ToRTS § 766 (1939), provides: "Except as
stated in Section 698, one who, without a privilege to do so, induces or otherwise
purposely causes a third person not to (a) perform a contract with another, or (b) enter
into or continue a business relation with another, is liable to the other for the harm
caused thereby."




Berea Bank & Trust Co.,'" rendered four months later, creates
some degree of uncertainty. The debtor in Henkin bought a
radio station, signing an installment note secured by a mort-
gage on the property. The seller offered to discount the note if
the debtor could repay more rapidly than the agreed-to terms.
The debtor sought a bank loan for this purpose, revealing to the
bank the seller's willingness to discount the note. The bank
refused the loan, but later bought the note from the seller at a
discount, and became the assignee of the mortgage. When the
debtor was a few days late with his first payment to the bank,
the bank instituted foreclosure proceedings. The debtor coun-
terclaimed against the bank, alleging that the bank had inten-
tionally induced the original seller to breach its contract with
him, or had interfered with a prospective advantage belonging
to him."5
The court expressed doubt that an actual contract for sale
of the note at a discount existed, but agreed that the bank's
purchase of the note was an interference with a prospective
advantage which was equivalent to interference with an exist-
ing contract."6 Although the court then purported to apply the
law of interference with a contractual relationship, it made no
mention of the Restatement position adopted in Carmichael.
Rather, it stated: "We conclude that tort liability exists in
Kentucky for the malicious interference with known contrac-
tual rights of another when special damage results therefrom,
at least when accomplished by some unlawful means such as
fraud, deceit or coercion."" 7 At this point in its opinion the
court invited a comparison to Carmichael, citing it in a foot-
note."' The court then held that the breach of a fiduciary or
confidential relationship, as alleged against the bank in this
case, would be equivalent to fraud and deceit.
It is unclear why the court discussed the fraud and deceit
' 566 S.W.2d 420 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
, Interference with a prospective advantage differs from interference with a con-
tractual relationship in that no contract need be proved. Liability may be imposed for
interference with an interest that is merely potential. See generally W. PROSSER, supra
note 104, at § 130.
"' 566 S.W.2d at 425.
17 Id. (emphasis added).
.'Id. at 425 n.1.
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requirement, since Carmichael eliminated this element of the
tort. By citing the case in a footnote the court apparently in-
tended to distinguish it, yet the body of the opinion states that
the two causes of action - interference with contract and inter-
ference with prospective advantage - are equivalent. Thus, it
is unclear whether a -plaintiff must prove fraud or deceit to
recover for interference with contractual or prospective advan-
tage. Kentucky's appellate courts should resolve this confusion
at the earliest opportunity.
B. Shopkeeper's Liability for Detention of a Shoplifter
During the 1978 legislative session, the Kentucky General
Assembly amended the shopkeeper's immunity statute to pro-
vide greater protection to merchants in detaining alleged shop-
lifters. Under the previous law, if a merchant had probable
cause to suspect shoplifting, the alleged shoplifter could be
taken into custody and detained in a reasonable manner for a
reasonable length of time, but only for the purpose of recover-
ing the goods."'
In a recent case, Super X Drugs of Kentucky v. Rice,2 the
Court of Appeals gave a narrow interpretation to this statute.
The plaintiff in Rice, suspected of shoplifting, surrendered the
items but was detained until the police arrived and escorted
her to the police station where she was arrested. In her action
for false imprisonment, the plaintiff argued that under Ken-
tucky law the shopkeeper's immunity ended when the purpose
of the detention was accomplished, i.e., when the goods were
recovered. The defendants countered that such a construction
would defeat the purpose of the statute, which they claimed
authorized detention until arrival of the police."' The court
found that the policy underlying the statute demanded that
the merchant be allowed to detain the suspect "for the time
necessary to make a reasonable investigation of the facts."1 2
However, the court expressly reserved the question of whether
a suspect could be detained after goods have been recovered for
the sole purpose of permitting an arrest by the police.
I" KRS § 433.236(1) (1975).
12 554 S.W.2d 903 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
121 Id. at 906.
I2 Id. at 907.
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In the wake of the Rice decision, the extent of the mer-
chant's detention privilege was uncertain. Consequently, the
legislature sought to clarify the law and provide maximum
protection for the merchant. The statute as amended provides
that merchants and their employees who have probable cause
to believe that goods have been stolen may detain the person
"in a reasonable manner for a reasonable length of time,"'1' for
any of five enumerated purposes: to request identification, to
verify identification, to make reasonable inquiry and investiga-
tion of the suspect, to recover goods, or to inform the police of
the detention and to surrender the suspect to the custody of the
police.' Another new provision makes clear that recovery of
goods by the merchant does not preclude continued detention
of the suspect for any other specified purpose.'2
The changes appear to be in direct response to the court's
analysis in Rice, and indicate the legislature's intent to provide
expansive protection for merchants in the area of shoplifting.
The new statute is atypical in its authorization of detention
pending police arrival.' Nevertheless, the provision seems rea-
sonable, as it will'be implemented only when search of a sus-
pect confirms the storekeeper's suspicion of shoplifting. Pre-
sumably, if no goods are discovered, the detention would cease
to be reasonable and the merchant's immunity would end. On
the other hand, if stolen goods are recovered, allowing a reason-
able time for police arrival does not seem unjust; the merchant
who acts unreasonably remains subject to liability for false
imprisonment. Thus, the amendment to the statute will proba-
bly have significant impact in facilitating more efficient arrest
and prosecution of shoplifters.
" KRS § 433.236(1) (Supp. 1978).
2 Id. at (1)(a)-(1)(e).
115 Id. at (2).
' Compare ILL. Rav. STAT. ch.38, § 10-3 (1975); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.125 (1969);
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2935.041 (Page 1978); TNN. CODE ANN. § 40-824 (1975); W.
VA. CODE § 61-3A-4 (1977).
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